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Abstract
Skyscrapers in Manhattan need to be anchored to bedrock to prevent (possibly un-
even) settling. This can potentially increase construction costs if the bedrock lies deep
below the surface. The conventional wisdom holds that Manhattan developed two busi-
ness centers—downtown and midtown—because the depth to the bedrock is close to the
surface in these locations, with a bedrock “valley” in between. We measure the eﬀects
of building costs associated with bedrock depths, relative to other important economic
variables in the location of early Manhattan skyscrapers (1890-1915). We ﬁnd that
bedrock depths had very little inﬂuence on the skyline; rather its polycentric devel-
opment was due to residential and manufacturing patterns, and public transportation
hubs.
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1Hour by hour the caissons reach down to the rock of the earth and hold the building
to a turning planet
- Carl Sandburg, “Skyscraper”
1 Introduction
T h ee a r t h ’ st e r r a i nh a sa l w a y sh a das t r o n gi n ﬂuence on the location of cities. In the United
States, for example, New York, Philadelphia and Boston were founded because of their easy
access to the sea. Chicago was founded because of its central location between east and west
and because it was a topographically ﬂat region near several major waterways. Further,
many early cities were located on hilltops to provide protection.
Less visible, however, is the role that geology can play in urban growth and in the spatial
distribution of economic activity. A region’s geology can aﬀect access to drinking water and
the ability to remove human waste. Geology can also aﬀect access to building materials,
such as limestone and marble.
In addition, geology can have strong impacts on buildings and their foundations. Struc-
tures in Mexico City, for example, are sinking because the drinking water in the aquifers
beneath the city are being depleted. The Leaning Tower of Pisa is perhaps the most famous
example of a building constructed without proper regard for the earth that supports it. More
broadly, however, geology can eﬀect the spatial distribution of economic activity within a
city or region. For instance, geology can enhance agglomeration economies by funneling
activity to geologically convenient areas; or geology can push economic activity apart when
there are natural barriers.
In this paper we study the eﬀect of geology on the spatial distribution of economic activity
and the creation of the Manhattan skyline. In the late-19th century, a set of technological
innovations allowed for the construction of skyscrapers. High-strength steel beams obviated
the use of thick load-bearing masonry walls. The introduction of electric elevators with
safety breaks made vertical transport both safe and fast. However, when skyscrapers become
technologically feasible, developers had to consider the geology below the buildings. Due to
their heavy load these buildings needed to be anchored to bedrock to prevent sinking and
2uneven settling. Often digging to bedrock in Manhattan was diﬃcult because of wet subsoil,
and caissons were needed to prepare the foundation (Landau and Condit, 1996).
A frequently-cited story in New York City’s history is that there are two separate busi-
ness districts—one centered near Wall Street, and one centered near Grand Central Station—
because of a deep bedrock “valley” between these two areas, where bedrock is up to 4 to 5
times deeper below the surface than on other parts of Manhattan Island. The conventional
wisdom is that skyscraper developers shied away from building where the bedrock depths
were too deep.
For example, New York geologist Christopher Schuberth (1968) writes, “[T]he skyscrapers
of New York City are clustered together into the midtown group, where the bedrock is within
several feet of the surface, and the downtown group, where the bedrock again reappears to
within forty feet of the surface near Wall Street....In any event, it is readily seen how clearly
the accessibility of the bedrock has, to some degree, controlled the architectural planning of
the city” (pps. 81-82).1
Though this story has become a New York legend, it has never been empirically tested.
In this paper we explore the degree to which the geology of Manhattan Island played a role
in its subsequent development using newly collected data that links skyscraper construction,
bedrock depths, building costs, and other relevant economic variables.
To the best of our knowledge no other paper has directly addressed the eﬀect of bedrock
on the Manhattan skyline. The eﬀects of geology on agglomeration have been explored in
a few works, including Rosenthal and Strange (2008) and Combes, et al. (2008). These
papers use geological features as econometric instruments in order to measure the eﬀects
of agglomeration economies on wages and productivity. Our results show that the bedrock
depths have very little inﬂuence on the placement of skyscrapers and therefore on agglom-
eration economies. Since Manhattan business districts emerged from other economic forces,
it appears that geological factors are not a strong, exogenous correlate with agglomeration
on the island.
In addition to the historical interest in the development of New York City, this paper
1Evidently, Schuberth’s words sparked the widespread belief that bedrock depths have determined the
skyline. Our results show that other economic factors were at work, with bedrock depths playing a small
role, at best. We thank Gideon Sorkin for providing the source of this legend.
3also contributes to broader questions about city formation and spatial structure. The Alonso
(1964) and Mills (1972) models of land values assume one center within a city or region; the
models generate steep rent gradients as one moves away from the central business district.
Gradients have been estimated for New York City by Atack and Margo (1998) for the years
1835 to 1900. One problem with the assumption of a monotonic gradient is that by the 1890’s
in Manhattan it not longer applies. Rather by the end of the 19th century, Manhattan was
becoming polycentric.
There have been several theoretical models that address the emergence of intra-urban
subcenters, such Fujita and Ogawa (1982) and Helsley and Sullivan (1991). McMillen and
Smith (2003) conclude that the theory points to two important variables that drive the
number of subcenters within a metropolitan region: population and commuting costs, with
the number of subcenters positively related to both. They empirically test these hypotheses
and ﬁnd that population and traﬃc congestion can account for close to 80% of the variation
in the number of subcenters across the U.S., as of 1990.
To the best of our knowledge, however, no work has directly addressed historical sub-
center formation. The implication of these models is that subcenter formation and “sprawl”
are post-World War II phenomena, or at least contingent upon the widespread use of the
automobile (Glaeser and Kahn, 2004). The evidence here suggests, however, that polycentric
urban development is a much earlier phenomena. Jackson (1987), for example, demonstrates
that the process of “suburbanization” in New York City began in the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h e1 8 t h
century, with the introduction of steam ferries and railroads. Our work shows that intra-city
(rather than intra-regional) subcenter formation was occurring in New York City during the
19th century. As such, midtown Manhattan perhaps represents one of America’s earliest
“edge cities” (Marshall, 2007; Garreau, 1991).
Despite our ﬁndings, the role that geology can play in the spatial structure of cities and
regions needs to be further explored. Anas et al.’s (1998) paper “Urban Spatial Structure,”
focuses on how agglomeration economies drive economic location choices with only a passing
mention of the role of say “a unique resource such as a harbor” (p. 1427). Davis and We-
instein (2002) conclude, however, that “locational fundamentals” are a driving force behind
the distribution of regional economic activity and growth. Though they don’t elaborate on
4what these locational fundamentals might be, the implication is that regions have some un-
derlying inherent diﬀerences, and that these diﬀerences may be geological.2 A recent paper
by Burchﬁeld et al. (2006) ﬁnd that geological features have important eﬀects for sprawl. For
example, they ﬁnd that the presence of mountains in the urban fringe is negatively related
to sprawl, while more gentle changes in terrain is positively related to sprawl. Also, they
ﬁnd that the greater the spread of underlying aquifers in a region the more likely there will
be sprawl.
In order to investigate the role of geology in the creation of Manhattan’s skyline, we
have compiled two new data sets. With the ﬁrst, we investigate how the bedrock depth
aﬀected construction costs for 53 large commercial buildings completed in New York City
between 1899 and 1915. We ﬁnd that having to dig to bedrock deep below the surface
did not dramatically increase construction costs for these projects. We ﬁn dt h ei n c r e a s ei n
constructions costs associated with digging to bedrock to be small relative to the overall
construction costs of a skyscraper, and relative to the land values of building lots.
We construct a second data set to investigate the location choices of skyscraper develop-
ers. In this data set we have collected depth to bedrock information at the location of 74
skyscrapers built in Manhattan between 1890-1915 (prior to the ﬁrst zoning requirements).
Along with this information we also collected information on demographic characteristics
of residents, availability of public transportation, land values, and other economically rele-
vant information near each of the 74 skyscraper locations. Finally, as a control group, we
collect the same information for 99 randomly selected non-skyscraper locations throughout
Manhattan (south of Central Park). We then estimate the probability of a skyscraper being
constructed at these locations as a function of the various explanatory variables.
Overall, our results suggest that bedrock had, at most, a small eﬀect on the formation
of the skyline. Rather, developers were most aﬀected by the other economic factors, such
as agglomeration economies in the already established centers, the distance to public trans-
portation, the desire to avoid being near slums and manufacturing districts and to be closer
to upper- and middle-class citizens in Manhattan. That is to say, the evidence strongly
2To Davis and Weinstein (2002), “locational fundamentals” are described as Ricardian technological
coeﬃcients and Hecksher-Olin endowments. More directly they also suggest that these fundamentals might
be related to the presence of ports or plains.
5Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Building Height (meters) 100.39 31.26 80 241
Building Height (stories) 23.74 7.79 12 57
Headquarters Dummy 0.41
Lower Manhattan Dummy 0.53
Table 1: Skyscraper descriptive statistics, 1890-1915. # obs=74. Sources: See Appendix.
suggests that the polycentric nature of Manhattan was driven more by the demand for sky-
scrapers and agglomeration beneﬁts in particular neighborhoods rather than the inability of
suppliers to provide skyscrapers in other places.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss Manhattan’s
history and geology. Then, in section 3 we provide a simple model of the supply and demand
for skyscrapers. Next, section 4 provides the results of the empirical analyses. Lastly section
5 provides some concluding remarks. An Appendix provides information about data sources
and preparation.
2 Manhattan
In this paper we focus on the ﬁrst generation of Manhattan skyscrapers in the period 1890 to
1915. The Tower Building, which was completed in 1889, is often considered New York’s ﬁrst
“skyscraper”; it was only 11 stories.3 The following year Joseph Pulitzer’s World building
was completed. At 94 meters it set the standard for New York skyscraper height, given it
was the world’s tallest building at the time.4 In the ensuing years buildings of 80 meters or
taller were relatively common in Manhattan and to simplify the discussion, for the remainder
of the paper, we deﬁne a “skyscraper” as a building that is 80 meters or taller.5
Because of the implementation of zoning regulations in 1916, and the building lull which
followed due to World War I and a subsequent recession, we focus on the ﬁrst generation of
3The Tower Building was considered a skyscraper because it was the ﬁrst building in New York to use
an all-steel cage design, instead of load-bearing masonry walls.
4There is debate about the World building’s actual number of stories; various sources put its range
between 16 and 20 stories.





,R 2 =0 89 # obs.=74; robust standard errors below estimates. Source: see
Appendix.
6Figure 1: Skyscrapers and non-skyscrapers in Manhattan, 1915. Skyscrapers are blue squares
and other buildings are circles. Sources: see Appendix.
skyscrapers, which ended in 1915.6 Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics about the
skyscrapers in our data set. From 1890 to 1915 we have found there were 74 skyscraper
completions, with the height ranging from 12 to 57 stories. Figure 1 displays the location of
these 74 skyscrapers as blue squares. The ﬁgure also shows the locations of a control group
of 99 randomly selected non-skyscraper buildings as red circles. (These are discussed in more
detail below.) The ﬁgure clearly shows the multi-centered nature of Manhattan. Roughly
one-half of the skyscrapers were built in lower Manhattan, with the rest built north of 14th
Street. About 40% of the skyscrapers were built as a “headquarters,” where we deﬁne this
to mean that a major corporation, such as a bank or newspaper publisher, had a major
equity stake in the building. The remaining buildings were either speculative oﬃce projects,
residential, or entertainment-related buildings.
6In 1916, New York City implemented a comprehensive zoning ordinance, which zoned economic activity
to speciﬁc areas and regulated building height. In particular, builders had to set back the higher ﬂoors away



















































Figure 2: Natural log of average land values in 1909 and average building heights in 1921
versus degrees latitude in Manhattan. Sources: see Appendix.
2.1 The “Great Leap”
During the late-19th century, New York developed three “centers” as deﬁn e db yl a n dv a l u e s
and building heights. Figure 2 further illustrates the polycentric nature of Manhattan in the
early 20th century.7 The ﬁrst center is that of lower Manhattan, with high land values and
tall buildings between Wall Street and City Hall. Another center developed between 14th
and 23rd Streets—between Union and Madison Squares. Finally another center developed
around Grand Central Station on 42nd Street.
As the ﬁgure clearly shows, between approximately latitudes 40.714◦ and 40.736◦,a v e r a g e
land values and building heights are much lower. This is the area of Manhattan north of
City Hall and south of 14th Street. The conventional wisdom is that this area of low heights
was due to a bedrock valley.
Also note the magnitude of the variation in land values, measured in dollars per foot
of street frontage. In particular, land values near Wall Street were far higher than land
values elsewhere in the city. Based on our data set, average land values (as measured per
foot of street frontage) south of latitude 40.713◦ (roughly City Hall) were $7,223; between
latitudes 40.713◦ and 40.736◦ (roughly 14th Street) average land values were $927; and north
7Average building heights are taken from our data set (discussed below), which contains skyscrapers and
randomly selected non-skyscrapers. As such, the average heights here do not directly measure the average
height of buildings, but rather represent a graphical depiction of the skyline itself. Also note that the island
of Manhattan is situated in a north-easterly direction, thus the locational markers on this graph and the





























Figure 3: Location of skyscrapers versus year of completion. Sources: see Appendix.
of latitude 40.736◦ average land values were $2,354.
Figure 3 shows that, in the initial period of skyscraper construction (1890 - 1902), build-
ings were concentrated in lower Manhattan. After 1902, there was a “great leap,” where a
large proportion of new skyscrapers were being constructed north of 14th Street. The ﬁgure
provides a scatter plot of the location of the skyscrapers on the North-South axis of Man-
hattan versus the year of their completions. In the early years (the lower left hand corner)
we see that virtually all of the buildings were south of 40.719◦ (south of City Hall). Starting
around 1903 we see that over 60% of skyscraper completions were north of 40.735◦ (north of
14th Street). Again there were no skyscrapers constructed between 40.719◦ and 40.735◦.
What caused this great leap? Was it bedrock, as the folklore suggests, or did other factors,
such as agglomeration and transportation costs or negative externalities caused by slums play
a role? One can a tell a story that supports either case (see Marshall, 2007). On one hand
bedrock depths may have presented an obstacle. On the other hand, the area between 40.719◦
and 40.735◦ had a high concentration of tenement housing and factories, and was relatively
under-served by public transportation. In addition, in 1871, New York City mandated that
the NY Central Railroad complete its Manhattan terminus at 42nd Street, well above the
area of dense economic activity, so as to reduce the amount of pollution and congestion in
lower Manhattan. As Manhattan grew, this area became a natural focal point for economic
activity. In addition, New York’s population was steadily moving northward. Generally
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Figure 4: Manhattan population and percent of population living above 40th Street. Source:
see Appendix.
movement as they ﬂed encroachment by commercial activity in the more southern districts
of the city.
As Figure 4 shows, both the population count and the fraction of the population living
above 40th Street steadily increased throughout the late-19th and early-20th centuries. Thus,
this northward movement of the population may have presented oﬃce-based ﬁrms with an
opportunity. By moving northward they could attract the high-quality labor force needed for
the developing service-based economy and pay lower wages due to workers’ lower commuting
costs. That is to say, the northward movement of skyscrapers may have represented an
adjustment toward a new spatial equilibrium.
Furthermore, Figure 5 shows the spatial distribution of two demographic groups in Man-
hattan in 1890: foreign born residents and white native born citizens with two native parents.
The ﬁgure shows that the two groups are generally segregated, with native whites most highly
clustered between Union Square (14th Street) and Madison Square Park (23rd Street). Fur-
thermore, foreign born residents are most highly clustered between 40.705◦ and 40.730◦, the
very area where the bedrock is the deepest.8 This correlation between foreign born residents
and bedrock depth is most likely a coincidence, since the ﬁrst skyscraper was completed in
1890, several years after neighborhoods like Five Points (Anbinder, 2001) and the Lower East
Side (Riis, 1890) became poor tenement districts.9 In theory, the developers of skyscrapers
8In fact, the correlation coeﬃcient between the percent of residents in each sanitation district that is
foreign born and the depth to bedrock is 0.50.
9There may be an underlying, indirect causation, however. Areas with bedrock near the surface are likely
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Figure 5: Percent foreign born and native white residents in the various sanitation districts
in Manhattan. Sources: see Appendix.
may have had a disincentive to place tall buildings in these poorer neighborhoods.
2.2 Manhattan Geology
As Landau and Condit (1996) write, “In theory, the geology of Manhattan Island is ideal for
skyscrapers” (p. 24). Bedrock generally lies near the surface, though there is a fair degree of
variation from north to south. Virtually all of Manhattan south of central park is comprised
of strong metamorphic rock, which is part of a larger formation known as the New England
Upland. The particular type of rock is referred to as Manhattan schist (Tamaro, et al., 2000;
Baskerville, 1994; Baskerville, 1982).
Figure 6 gives an indication of how bedrock depths vary from the southern tip of Man-
hattan to Central Park South. At the southern tip of Manhattan bedrock depths start at
about 8 meters below the surface; going north, the bedrock dips down into a kind of bedrock
valley, which reaches its greatest depth between City Hall and Canal Street. The bedrock
depths then decrease up to around 14th Street, where, on average they remain relatively
close to the surface, moving northward.
In addition to the depth to bedrock, Figure 6 also indicates the location of skyscrapers
throughout Manhattan south of Central Park. The triangles are locations of the 74 sky-
been less desirable properties for commercial activity in the 17th and 18th centuries, which, in turn, evolved
into manufacturing and low-income neighborhoods in the 19th century. We thank geologist Alec Gates for
this comment.
11scrapers in our data and the circles are the additional 99 randomly chosen non-skyscraper
locations. As the ﬁgure shows, there are two concentrations of skyscrapers, one between
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Figure 6: Depths to bedrock for Manhattan, south of Central Park. Depth is measured
relative to the surface. Sources: see Appendix.
In regard to the eﬀect of depth to bedrock on skyscraper locations, there are at least four
hypotheses. First, bedrock may have been a strong technological determinant that prevented
skyscrapers in the bedrock valley, even in the face of agglomeration beneﬁts. Simply put, it
may have been technologically infeasible to build a skyscraper if the depth to bedrock was
too great. However, Figure 6 indicates that this was not the case. The deepest bedrock in
our data set is just over 45 meters but some skyscrapers built during this time period were
anchored to bedrock 40 meters below the surface. Second, if building above deep bedrock
was technologically feasible it may be that skyscraper construction in the bedrock valley was
t o oc o s t l yr e l a t i v et ot h eb e n e ﬁts. Again, this possibility is somewhat disproved by Figure
6. Skyscrapers were built above some of the deepest bedrock in the city. Thus it appears
that it was economically feasible to build over deep bedrock when there were also suﬃcient
demand-side beneﬁts. These ﬁrst two hypotheses contain the conventual wisdom of New
York City folklore.
A third possibility is that small changes in the foundation costs may have produced large
changes in the location decisions of developers. That is to say, depth to bedrock may have
g e n e r a t e da“ t i p p i n ge ﬀect” so that at some point, a small increase in depth to bedrock
12increased construction costs just enough so that developers decided to choose a location
north of the bedrock valley where bedrock was close to the surface. Finally, the eﬀect of
depth to bedrock may have been irrelevant or small enough that it did not greatly eﬀect the
location choice of builders. We analyze and test these hypotheses in the rest of the paper.
3 A Simple Model
Below we develop a simple supply and demand model that will allow us to parse out the
eﬀects of depth to bedrock and agglomeration economies in our data. Throughout the model
we assume a linear city on some interval, with locations denoted  ∈ [0 ¯ ],w i t h0 being the
exogenously determined city center. (For example, from south to north up Manhattan along
Broadway). Let ()=|0 − | =  be a ﬁrm’s distance from the center. Furthermore,
to keep the model simple, we investigate a static model; however we discuss the dynamic
implications later in the paper. In short, the aim of the model is to derive a set of testable
hypotheses about the eﬀect of bedrock anchoring costs versus other economic factors in
accounting for the spatial distribution of the skyline and hence of economic activity.
3.1 The Demand For Height
We assume that each oﬃce-based ﬁrm has the following proﬁt function:
()=() () − −  −  (1)
where  () is a production function, with oﬃce space ( for height) and labor, , as inputs.
Assume  () has the standard features (continuous, positive ﬁrst derivatives and negative
second derivatives, etc.). Without loss of generality plots of land are ﬁxed and normalized to
size one.10 () represents the net agglomeration eﬀects for oﬃce-based ﬁr m sa saf u n c t i o n
of distance from the center. As will be discussed below, () represents the net eﬀects
of both positive centripetal forces (such as knowledge spillovers, reduced communication
10The 1811 Gridplan of New York set standard plot sizes of 25’ by 100’. It has been argued that this small
plot size created artiﬁcial land scarcity by the 1890s since the large plot assemblages needed for skyscrapers
became relatively diﬃcult. See Willis (1995), for example.
13costs, etc.) and negative centrifugal forces (such as proximity to manufacturing and “slum”
neighborhoods, etc.). Assume, however, that 1 ≤ () ≤ (0) that is, net agglomeration
eﬀects are greatest at the center, and no ﬁrms have proﬁts reduced because of a lack of
agglomeration beneﬁts. Also assume that 0 ()  0; that is agglomeration eﬀects, ceteris
paribus, are strictly decreasing from the center.  is the per ﬂoor cost of renting oﬃce space.
 is the wage, which we assume, for now, is ﬁxed.  is a ﬁrm’s ﬁxed costs.
Each ﬁrm must choose a building height that will maximize its proﬁts. For now, assume
that labor is instantaneously adjustable, so the optimal quantity is always chosen. This gives
rise to a demand for height for each ﬁrm, via the ﬁrst order condition:
 = ()()
3.2 The Building Decision
Developers, who supply this height, have proﬁt functions given by
()=− ( ) −  (2)
where  is the total revenue that can be earned from a building of height  (assume without
loss of generality that a building’s operating costs are zero). ( ) is the construction cost,
a n di ti saf u n c t i o no fb o t ht h eh e i g h to ft h eb u i l d i n ga n di t sl o c a t i o nf r o mt h ec e n t e r .T h e
reason distance matters for construction costs is because, as will be discussed below, the
bedrock underneath the surface varies as one moves away from the center. Thus the costs
of digging to bedrock is also a function of distance from the center. Assume that  (·)  0
 (·)  0 and  (·) ≥ 0.  is the price of land. Via the ﬁrst order condition, we have the
supply function for height:
 =  ( )
143.2.1 Choice of Height
Given oﬃce-based ﬁrms demand for height and developers supply of height, we have for each




Note that we assume that  is an exogenous variable. This accords with the standard land-
use models of Alonso and Mills, for example. If land markets are competitive then they will
generate a spatial equilibrium where no ﬁrm can improve its proﬁts by moving or changing
its height decision. Thus height at each location will reﬂect this no-arbitrage condition and
will, in essence, be exogenous for each ﬁrm.
Below we analyze the eﬀects of bedrock on the height decision. But, as an example, let’s
assume that bedrock costs are constant for all locations, so that ( )=() Taking





[ (∗) − () (∗)]
 0
which shows that equilibrium height is decreasing from the center; this negative eﬀect is
driven by the drop oﬀ in agglomeration eﬀects.
3.3 Bedrock Eﬀects and the Supply of Height
Assume that a builder must consider the “bedrock costs” at each location, especially if there
is an interaction between the height of a building and the depth to bedrock.11 For instance,
as mentioned in the introduction, building above a speciﬁed height, denoted ¯ ,m a yr e q u i r e










is an indicator variable equal to one if a building of height ¯  or greater is going
to be built, and zero otherwise. () is the additional costs associated with anchoring the
building to the bedrock, with  ()  0 and  ()  0() is the construction costs
for a building of height ;w i t h0 ()  0 and 00 ()  0







If the proﬁt maximizing height at location  is less than ¯ , then depth to bedrock plays no
role in the decision making. However, if at ¯  −  the marginal beneﬁt is greater than the
marginal cost a developer may stop and build at this height, if the marginal bedrock costs of
adding  units of height is very large. Thus whether a developer builds to a height taller than
¯  depends on the relationship of the marginal beneﬁts to the marginal costs of height at ¯ ,
which includes the cost of anchoring the building to the bedrock at location . Speciﬁcally,
if for location ,  − 0(¯ )  0 ¡¯ 
¢
a developer builds to height ¯ ;i fn o t ,h eb u i l d st o
height  ≤ ¯ .
Furthermore, we can assume that for the developer,  = () such that 0 ()  0 That
is, builders will face a lower rent at a greater distance from the center, because of the lower
agglomeration beneﬁts to oﬃce-based ﬁrms. As such the supply of height as a function of
distance will depend on both the rents at every location and the degree to which bedrock
costs increase or decrease as a function of distance.
3.3.1 Bedrock Depth Function
Assume that bedrock depths follows the shape given in Figure 6. That is, the distance to
bedrock initially increases sharply to a peak and then falls oﬀ until a plateau is reached.
Again, suppose that ¯  indicates the height above which it becomes necessary to anchor the
building to bedrock. If the height is such that ¯  the marginal cost is constant with
respect to distance from the city center since the depth to bedrock will not play a role in the
costs of construction. On the other hand, if  ≥ ¯ , then the marginal cost will be a function





Figure 7: Costs and beneﬁts of skyscrapers as a function of distance.
dimensional model.
Figure 7 shows how the relative marginal beneﬁts and costs of building to bedrock would
presumably vary as a function of distance, given the observed bedrock valley north of City
Hall. The “beneﬁtg a p ”d e p i c t e di nt h eﬁgure is given by the diﬀerence of  − 0 ().I f
 − 0 ¡¯ 
¢
is large then we would expect to see a skyscraper since the additional costs of
anchoring the building will be less than the additional beneﬁts. If  − 0 ¡¯ 
¢
is small or
negative we would expect to see a non-skyscraper constructed at that location.
In lower Manhattan we would expect to see skyscrapers given the relatively high rents
and low costs of anchoring the buildings. As we move away from the center, the eﬀects
o nt h es k y l i n eo v e rt h eb e d r o c k“ v a l l e y ”w o u l db eaf u n c t i o no ft h es i z eo ft h ed i ﬀerence
 − 0 ¡¯ 
¢
. Recall that rents that can be charged decrease as one moves away from the city
center due to smaller agglomeration beneﬁts. If the diﬀerence −0 ¡¯ 
¢
decreased smoothly,
and bedrock costs were constant, we should simply see a smooth decline in building heights
away from the center. However, if the bedrock costs suddenly become large as one moved
slightly north, we would expect to see a plateau; the agglomeration beneﬁts at some point
would not compensate for the additional bedrock costs, and builders would only build to
height ¯  −  instead of building a skyscraper.
Figure 8 shows a skyline that we would expect to see if agglomeration beneﬁts remained





Figure 8: Equilibrium height as a function of the distance from the center.
That is to say, as the depth from the center increased we would expect to see a height plateau
over the bedrock valley with building heights slightly lower than in the ﬁnancial district.
But, given the steep drop-oﬀ in building heights observed in Figure 2, it would again
suggest that bedrock costs did not provide a strong barrier to skyscraper construction nor
did bedrock induce a tipping eﬀect. In that ﬁgure we see a sharp and sudden decrease in
building height rather than a height plateau. In other words, it appears that the supply
side eﬀects, namely bedrock costs, were not responsible for the lack of skyscrapers above the
bedrock valley. This strongly implies that other demand side factors were pushing developers
away from this area.
3.4 Demand Side Eﬀects
We have not, as of yet, addressed the “great leap,” where skyscrapers emerged in midtown at
the beginning of the 20th century. If bedrock eﬀects were enough to cause building heights
to drop oﬀ as we move from the city center, this begs the question: what caused the building
h e i g h t st or i s ea g a i nn o r t ho f1 4 t hS t r e e t ?
To parse this out, we now turn to the demand side of height and focus on those elements
that may drive oﬃce-based ﬁrms to demand tall buildings further away from downtown. Let’s
now assume that there are two kinds of externalities facing ﬁrms. First assume there are
positive beneﬁts from oﬃce-based ﬁrms being close to each other. These include knowledge
spillovers and reduced communication costs. However, we can also assume that oﬃce-based
18ﬁrms do not want to be near certain kinds of economic activity. In particular, we can assume
that being close to factories and low-income neighborhoods provides a negative eﬀect on
ﬁrms for several reasons. First oﬃce-based ﬁrms draw their supply of labor mostly from
educated white-collar workers. All else equal, ﬁrms would like to be closer to their labor
force. But if there is a slum district nearby this may provide a barrier keeping white collar
workers from residing near their workplaces. Secondly, being next to a manufacturing ﬁrm
might increase its closeness to pollution and congestion and not project the right image for
corporate businesses.
The standard Alonso-type land use model shows that there will be a natural segregation
of economic activity, with oﬃce-based ﬁrms at the center, then manufacturing districts and
their workers next, and then, ﬁnally, a wealthy suburban ring, with upper and middle class
families who commute to the city center. Before 1890, this pattern of land use ﬁt Manhattan
quite well. But, if oﬃce-based ﬁrms seek to expand in a growing city, then they potentially
can gain a wage cost reduction if they move closer to their workers. That is, say that there
is a middle-class enclave around Madison Square Park (at 23rd Street and Broadway). A
potential employee might be indiﬀerent between excepting a lower wage and not having
to commute or a higher wage and commuting downtown. This can create an exploitable
opportunity for ﬁrms: by moving closer to their employees they can pay a lower wage
(DiPasquale and Wheaton, 1996 pages 103-111; Moses, 1962). As such, the “great leap”
may represent a movement toward a new spatial equilibrium, whereby ﬁrms move north to
be near their workers; this movement then increases land values, as a new business district
emerges. This, in turn, provides incentives for builders to build taller due to the relatively
large ﬁxed cost of land acquisition.
3.4.1 Wages and Agglomeration
Now we develop the model to include the eﬀects of labor costs, to see how they aﬀect height at
various locations. Assume that oﬃce-based ﬁr m sh a v eap r o ﬁt function as given by equation
(1), but that wages are now given by ()=0+ That is, the wage paid at each location
is a function of the marginal product of labor, 0, plus an additional component that is the
compensation for commuting costs, which are positively related to the distance from the
19center;  is a measure of transportation costs.
The ﬁrst order conditions give
 = () ()
0 +  = () ()
These two equations can be solved for the demand for height and labor respectively (assuming
the production function can be inverted, etc.) to give
 = (() 0 + ) (6)
 = (() 0 + ) (7)
Inserting the supply equation, eq. (4), into the demand equations (eqs. (6) and (7)),
allows us to solve for the two equilibrium equations for labor and height, respectively. Since
the height equation is primarily of interest, we then have

∗ ()=
∗ (()c 0 + )
where c is a vector of parameters that relate to the cost of construction, which include the
marginal cost parameter for adding extra height, as well as the bedrock-cost parameters, if
a skyscraper is completed.
In short, the equilibrium condition gives us testable predictions: the greater the ag-
glomeration eﬀects, the taller the heights of the buildings; the greater the costs of building
(including the bedrock costs), the lower the equilibrium height. Further if capital and labor
are substitutes, then increases in wages will increase heights. And, ﬁnally, an increase in
transportation costs will also increase heights.
Wages and Locational Re-adjustments Now let’s assume that because of population
growth a ﬁrm can “jump” from location  to location 0  , where a large fraction of
potential workers reside, and pay a wage of 0 at location 0 (say around 23rd Street and
Broadway in Manhattan) instead of 0 + at location . In other words, let’s assume that
20there is a critical mass of oﬃce workers living at and around location 0 such that ﬁrms do
not have to pay workers for their commuting costs. If a growing population and reduction in
transportation costs causes residential neighborhoods to emerge away from the center, then
ﬁrms can potentially locate near their workers and pay lower wages. This could potentially
set in motion the rise of a new oﬃce-based sector within the city.
First, in midtown, the quantity of labor employed will increase as wages fall. Initially,
this will have a direct eﬀect of decreasing equilibrium heights (no additional height would be
added to the skyline). However, there would be a secondary eﬀect. Assume that agglomer-
ation economies are a function of the total labor at or near a particular location, such that








where ∗ () is the amount of labor at location  () is the weighting function, based on
the distance of  to  with a greater weight for distances closer to  Finally, ¯  i st h ee d g eo f
the city. Then as workers are hired in the new location, it causes agglomeration economies
to increase. This, in turn, causes both the proﬁt maximizing height and labor quantities
to increase as well; this then generates a new business district with new skyscrapers. As in
Fujita’s and Ogawa (1982) model, the transition from a monocentric city to a duocentric
city emerges when population increases or when transportation costs increase (which here
would be interpreted as a rise in congestion at the city center).
4 Empirical Results
In the remainder of the paper we examine two new data sets that help us to investigate the
eﬀect of depth to bedrock on the creation of the Manhattan skyline. First we look at the
eﬀect of bedrock depths on skyscraper construction costs. Second, we look at the eﬀect of
bedrock depths on the location of skyscrapers. Below we give a brief discussion of each data
set. More details are given in the Appendix.
214.1 Data
4.1.1 Construction Cost Data
We have created a data set with actual construction costs for 53 commercial buildings con-
structed in Manhattan between 1899 and 1915. Total cost and building volume data come
from the cost job book of the Fuller Construction Company (housed at The Skyscraper
Museum in New York City). Building heights come from either http://skyscraperpage.com
or the A t l a so ft h eB o r o u g ho fM a n h a t t a n(1921). Along with the construction data we
also measure the depth to bedrock at each building location. Speciﬁcally, bedrock depths
relative to sea level were obtained from the “Rock Data Map Of Manhattan” provided by
Dr. Klaus Jacob of the Lamont Observatory. The map provides bedrock depth data for
speciﬁc locations based on geological borings. For most large buildings in our data set the
Rock Data Map provides depths for the exact building lot (since borings and measurements
were commonly taken during the construction process). In the case of a missing data point
on a speciﬁc block, an arithmetic average of the surrounding data points has been used.
The depth to bedrock measure used in this paper is determined by subtracting the depth
to bedrock relative to sea level from the elevation relative to sea level.12 We control for the
costs of construction over time by using the real value of brick costs in New York City at the
time of construction, which comes from the Historical Statistics of the United States.C o s t s
were normalized so that the year 1896 had a value of 1.0. With this data set we are able to
explore the eﬀect of depth to bedrock on the actual construction costs of these large building
projects in New York City at the time of interest.
4.1.2 Skyscraper Location Data
In order to investigate the eﬀect of bedrock on the placement of skyscrapers, we have collected
d e p t ht ob e d r o c ka n do t h e rr e l e v a n te c o n o m i ci n f o r m a t i o no n1 7 3l o c a t i o n si nM a n h a t t a n .
The locations are chosen in the following manner. First, we locate all buildings constructed
in New York City 80 meters or taller between 1890 and 1915. We have found that there were
74 buildings meeting this criteria. The building data comes from http://skyscraperpage.com
12Elevation, longitude and latitude are found via the Google-based software tool DigiPoint2
(http://www.zonums.com/gmaps/digipoint2.html). Elevation is relative to sea level.
22and/or http://emporis.com. For each building, these websites provide the year of completion,
the number of ﬂoors, and the height. The number of ﬂoors was additionally checked against
the Atlas of New York City, Borough of Manhattan (1921). Information about the location
and whether they were the headquarters for a ﬁrm comes from historical articles about each
building in the New York Times.
As a comparison/control group we also selected 99 additional random locations in Man-
hattan south of Central Park/59th Street. The random locations were chosen in the fol-
lowing manner. Each city block in Manhattan is assigned a unique tax block identiﬁcation
number. We randomly chose 99 city block numbers south of 59th Street using a stan-
dard random number generator. (There are approximately 1500 tax blocks below 59th
Street.) For each block selected we then randomly chose a lot on the block. The block
number and the lot for the skyscraper group are obtained through the NYC Map Portal
(http://gis.nyc.gov/doitt/mp/Portal.do). This yielded a total of 173 locations in Manhat-
tan south of Central Park. Again, the non-skyscraper lots were checked with the Atlas of
New York City, Borough of Manhattan (1921) to conﬁrm that no skyscrapers existed on
these lots.
For each of the 173 locations we then collected several variables of interest. We collected
the depth to bedrock using the same manner described in the construction cost data. In
addition, as a robustness check we consulted bedrock depth maps created by the U.S. Ge-
ological Survey: “Bedrock And Engineering Geological Maps Of New York County.” The
second map provides information in the form of contours for the bedrock surface, with con-
tour intervals of 20 feet. For the probit regressions, depth to bedrock is taken as an average
of the depths from the ﬁrst and second maps.13
In addition we have collected data for several variables that may also aﬀect the probability
of skyscraper construction at a location. We also have collected demographic information
at several geographic levels. By 1890, New York City was divided into Wards, Sanitation
Districts (SDs) and state Assembly Districts (ADs). Wards contained one or more SDs (see
13The two maps and methods yield very consistent results. The correlation between the two maps/methods
is 0.94. In addition, as reported above, we use the average of the two methods in our empirical results below.
We note that our empirical results do not signiﬁcantly change if we use one map or the other independently,
or the average of the two.
23Table 4 for the average sizes of the districts).
From Pratt (1911), we have AD data for manufacturing worker density. The Census
Bureau’s Vital Statistics of New York and Brooklyn Covering a Period of Six Year Ending
May 31, 1890 provides population density, racial demographics and park space information
at the SD level. We hypothesize that white collar ﬁrms would have an incentive to avoid
locating in districts with large numbers of minority or recent immigrant populations, which
tended to be lower income districts. We also expect that white collar ﬁrms avoided districts
where manufacturing ﬁrms commonly located and districts that had large numbers of man-
ufacturing workers (as opposed to white collar workers). Park space would be important for
skyscrapers for two reasons. First, presumably the more park space the higher the quality
of the neighborhood, ceteris paribus, and thus the more attractive to white collar workers;
second, for the ﬁrst generation of skyscrapers, access to sunlight was very important, and
park space or cemetery space near a building would ensure greater light availability.
Access to public transportation, especially rapid transit, is likely to be a beneﬁtt oﬁrms.
We counted the number of elevated railway stops within a half-mile radius from each location
in our data set from the 1890 Elevated Railway Map of New York (Landers, 2000).14 We
calculated the distance to New York City’s “ﬁnancial district” (the intersection Wall Street
and Broadway) from each location in our data set using the latitude and longitude of each
location address. We expect that since this location is the center of commercial and ﬁnancial
activity (which emerged in the early 19th century), a shorter distance will increase the
likelihood of a skyscraper being constructed. This may be thought of as a rough proxy for
agglomeration beneﬁts.
Lastly, land values are likely to be a determinant of skyscraper activity. As land values
increase, holding square footage or volume constant, builders have an incentive to build a
taller building on less land instead of a shorter building on more land. Thus skyscrapers
are more likely when land values are high. We collect information on the land values from
“Tentative Land Value Maps of the City of New York”(1909). Land values are given per foot
14Note that the New York City subway ﬁrst opened in 1904. The ﬁrst line ran from City Hall, up the
east side of Manhattan to Grand Central Station, then west along 42nd Street to Times Square, then north
along Broadway. Its initial route therefore tended to reinforce or invigorate the commercial centers that were
starting to form along 42nd Street.
24of street frontage. Note that “land values” are only the value of the land; they exclude the
value of improvements. For each location in the data set, average land values are calculated
for the block on which the location resides.15
4.2 The Eﬀect of Depth to Bedrock on Skyscraper Construction
Costs
We ﬁrst discuss the eﬀect of bedrock on construction costs. Table 2 provides the descriptive
statistics of the variables contained in the construction cost data set described above. Table
3 presents the results of regressions of the log of total costs on several important variables.
Equation (1) in Table 3 includes the depth to bedrock, the building height, the building
volume, an index of brick costs in New York City, and an interaction term between the
building height and the depth to bedrock. Equation (2) in Table 3 includes an interaction
term between the building height, the depth to bedrock and a dummy variable that takes on
the value of one if the building is a skyscraper (18 ﬂoors or greater), and a zero otherwise.
Since bedrock should have the most important eﬀect for a tall building, we interact the
depth to bedrock with a skyscraper dummy variable. Presumably a taller skyscraper is even
more sensitive to bedrock depth than a “marginally” tall skyscraper. In equation (3) we
include the bedrock depth interacted with a skyscraper dummy variable (but not height).
In equation (4) we interact the bedrock variable with a downtown dummy variable (south
of 14th Street) because downtown the bedrock is generally further down and the subsoil is
often wet and comprised of quicksand.
All four speciﬁcations give very similar results. We see that the bedrock terms are all
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in all speciﬁcations. However, the signs on the bedrock
terms are more complicated than expected. Deep bedrock, on its own, actually lowers the
cost of construction. Presumably this is because having bedrock too near the surface is
actually a hinderance to clear space for a foundation. One may have to remove bedrock to
build a foundation in some cases. But, if building a skyscraper of suﬃcient height, deep
15There is likely to be an endogenous relationship between land values and the presence of skyscrapers,
since the land value data is from 1909. Ideally, we would like to have land value calculations for a period
prior to initial skyscraper construction, such as 1890, but this data were not available. We include it in our
regressions for the sake of comparison, despite the possible endogeneity.
25Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Building Height (stories) 15.43 6.04 3.00 32.00
Bedrock Depth (meters) 14.56 9.61 0.276 51.7
Total Construction Costs ($000) 1,282.8 1,456.5 117.3 7,568.8
Building Volume (000 cubic feet) 3,151.0 3,202.8 292.5 18,200.0
Real NYC Brick Costs (1896=1.0) 1.012 0.180 0.79 1.40
Skyscraper Dummy 0.434
Downtown Dummy 0.679
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for 53 buildings constructed in Manhattan from 1899-1915.
Note that brick costs statistics are based on annual time series data. Sources: see Appendix.
bedrock does increase costs as expected. In equation (1), the sum of bedrock depth and
the interaction of bedrock depth with building height yields a net increase in construction
costs if the building is greater than about 21 stories. If we consider estimation (2), with
the height-skyscraper interaction, then for a building of approximately 20 stories or taller,
bedrock becomes a net cost. As an extreme example, the tallest building in our cost data set
(32 stories) would produce a net coeﬃcient of 0.0071. This would equate to an increase in
total construction cost of about $9,000 for each additional meter of depth to bedrock. If we
consider a one-standard deviation change in depth to bedrock from the average (9.61 meters)
we get slightly more than a $90,000 (7%) increase in total building costs for this skyscraper.
For a less extreme example, consider a building of 21 stories (the median skyscraper in our
data). In this case, each additional foot in depth to bedrock would result in about $650 in
additional building costs. A one standard deviation change in depth to bedrock would result
in about $6,000 of additional building costs (less than a 1/2% increase in total building costs
on average).
Recall that in Figure 2 land values varied, on average, by about $6,000 per linear foot
of frontage between the ﬁnancial district and the bedrock valley zone. Speciﬁcally, average
land values per foot of street frontage were $7,223 south of City Hall, $927 between City
Hall and 14th Street, and $2,354 north of 14th Street. The average plot size for a skyscraper
in our data set is just over 25,000 square feet (about 160 feet2). If we assume 160 feet of
frontage for a skyscraper and multiply this by the land values per foot, we get the following
land value estimates for a skyscraper lot in each area of interest: $1,155,000 south of City
Hall, $148,300 between City Hall and 14th Street, and $376,000 north of 14th Street. Next
26Dep. Var.: Ln(Total Cost)





































2 0.925 0.928 0.928 0.931
¯ 2 0.9166 0.9206 0.9212 0.9231
Table 3: 53 observations. Robust t-statistics below coeﬃcients. ∗Stat. sig. at 95% level;
∗∗Stat. sig. at 99% level.
consider the average depth to bedrock in each of these three regions: 22 meters south of City
Hall, 26 meters between City Hall and 14th Street, and 7 meters north of 14th Street.
If one additional meter of bedrock increased costs by about $9,000 (as reported above),
then constructing a skyscraper on the average lot in the bedrock valley was only $36,000
more expensive (since the bedrock is four meters deeper on average) compared to south of
City Hall. But the lot is less expensive by more than $1,000,000 in the bedrock valley vis a
vis south of City Hall. Thus even taking into account the additional costs of deeper bedrock,
the total cost of constructing a skyscraper in the ﬁnancial district is far more expensive once
land values are included. A developer would save substantial sums of money by buying a
lot in the bedrock valley at a much lower price and paying the additional costs of digging to
the bedrock. Note that this would be true even if one had to pay additional bedrock costs
of the maximum depth of bedrock in our data 46 meters (46 meters x $9,000 = $414,000;
still well below the diﬀerence in lot acquisition).
In addition, building a skyscraper north of 14th street would save 19 meters of digging
to bedrock compared to the bedrock valley for a savings of 19 ×$9000 = $171000.A g a i n ,
27the savings in terms of bedrock costs are smaller than the diﬀerence in the value of land
between the two areas.
Even though deep bedrock had the potential to increase the costs of construction, these
costs were small compared to diﬀerences in the land acquisition costs. Thus the idea that
the costs of digging to bedrock prohibited the construction of skyscrapers in the bedrock
valley is unjustiﬁed. Because of lower land prices, skyscrapers could have been built in the
bedrock valley at total costs less than they were built in other areas of Manhattan. The
fact that builders were willing to build on these other lots suggests that other explanations
are more plausible for the lack of skyscrapers in the bedrock valley, namely, agglomeration
externalities, and other economic and demographic factors which we explore next.
4.3 The Eﬀect of Depth to Bedrock on Skyscraper Location
Because we are interested in whether the bedrock or other variables inﬂuenced the spatial
distribution of tall buildings, we perform a probit analysis, which estimates the probability
of a skyscraper (versus non-skyscraper) being built at a particular location as a function of
several variables, including the distance from the city center (speciﬁed as the distance in
kilometers from the corner of Wall Street and Broadway), the depth to bedrock, the land
price (from the 1909 Land Value maps), population density for each sanitation district (in
1890), manufacturing worker density for each Assembly District (in 1906), the percent of
each sanitation district’s residents that are white with two native parents, the percent black
and the percent foreign, the number of hectares of park space (and cemetery space) and the
number of elevated railway transit stops within a half mile radius of each building (in 1890).
Table 4 gives the descriptive statistics of these variables; Table 5 gives the results of various
speciﬁcations.
Generally, as can be seen from Table 5 the coeﬃcients have the expected signs. The
likelihood of a skyscraper being built decreases with the depth to bedrock (though is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, and is not robust across speciﬁcations), the distance to the
city center of Wall Street and Broadway, and in the density of manufacturing workers in
the area. The probability of a skyscraper increases in the number of transit stops and with
higher land values. The probability of a skyscraper being built is positively related to the
28Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Skyscrapers 0.43
Building height (stories) 15.03 10.5 2 55
Avg. bedrock depth (meters) 17.07 12.0 -1.19 47.01
SD Area (hectares) 32.2 8.80 10.5 47.3
SD Pop. Density excluding Parks/Cems. 394.1 332.2 30.2 1386.3
SD Park and cemetary space (hectares) 0.898 2.16 0.00 9.7
SD % Pop. white with both parents native 21.8 13.3 3.36 50.63
SD % Population foreign 43.1 8.12 22.0 63.8
SD % Population black 2.66 3.16 0.026 18.4
AD Area (hectares) 148.9 78.0 39.7 466.6
AD Factory worker density (per hectare), 1906 205.4 185.1 3.68 751.9
Avg. Land values ($ per foot of frontage), 1909 3,122 3,879 285 16,900
# El Stops within 1/2 mile radius 6.53 3.05 0 13
Table 4: Descriptive statistics. # obs. is 173. All data from 1890, except where otherwise
noted. Sources: see Appendix. Note: SD, AD means are weighted based on # of buildings
in these areas.
percent of native whites in the neighborhood. Also, the amount of park space is positively
related to the probability of a skyscraper being built in that neighborhood.
In addition, to parse out possible bedrock eﬀects, in Table 5, equations (2) and (6), show
the results of regressions where the bedrock variable is split into two variables: the depth of
bedrock interacted with a dummy variable if the bedrock is below sea level and the depth
of bedrock interacted with a dummy variable if the bedrock is above sea level. Presumably,
if the bedrock is below sea level digging down to it would be more diﬃcult since it would
be more likely to contain wet soil or quicksand. From these regressions, however, there is
no eﬀect from the bedrock that is below sea level, while we see a positive eﬀect from the
depth to bedrock above sea level indicating that deep bedrock is conducive to building a
skyscraper. The reason for this counter-intuitive result is most likely due to the fact that
the bedrock above sea level is also very close to the surface, or perhaps above the surface in
some cases; and the closer it is, the more likely the bedrock becomes a nuisance because it
has to be removed via blasting in order to lay a foundation. This concords with our total
cost regressions which show a negative cost eﬀect for bedrock when a non-skyscraper is being
built.
Land prices are most likely endogenous, but we include them in equation (5) to investigate
their possible eﬀects. The results must be interpreted with caution. As we can see, land












BR Depth ×( Sea Lvl) 0035
(287)∗∗ 0003
(211)∗
Pop. Density per SD −000005










% SD Residents Black 000004
(296)∗∗
% SD Residents Foreign −000002
(226)∗
AD Worker Density, 1905 −000015



















ln(Land Values), 1909 0025
(415)∗∗
psuedo-R2 0.025 0.071 0.593 0.612 0.744 0.619
psuedo-Log Likelihood -78.5 -74.8 -32.8 -31.2 -20.7 -30.7
Table 5: Probit: Dep. Var: Skyscraper=1; no skyscraper=0. Marginal eﬀects are reported.
z-statistics below marginal eﬀects. ∗Stat. sig. at 95% level; ∗∗Stat. sig. at 99% level. The
regression was run with weights that were the inverse of the building height, to account for
the over-sampling of skyscrapers in the data set.
prices are perhaps the most important factor in the location of skyscrapers. Also there may
be some concern that our measure of factory workers in each assembly district is endogenous
for some years. However, most factories in these districts were established before 1890 and
therefore strongly correlate with past decisions about land use. Thus the presence of factory
workers is likely to be exogenous to the presence of skyscrapers constructed after 1890.
To investigate the magnitude of the eﬀects, we also present the elasticities of the inde-
pendent variables with respect to the probability of a skyscraper being built at a speciﬁc
location for speciﬁcations (3), (5), and (6). We ﬁnd that there are several almost equally
important factors in the likelihood of building a skyscraper. The most important factors
are the land prices, density of manufacturing workers, the access to public transportation,
t h ep e r c e n to fw h i t en a t i v er e s i d e n t sa n dt h ed i s t a n c et ot h eﬁnancial district center at Wall






BR Depth x Below Sea Level −0574
(055)
BR Depth x Above Sea Level 0796
(210)∗




























ln(Land Values), 1909 325
(331)∗∗
Table 6: Elasticities of coeﬃcients from probit regressions, given in Table 5. Absolute value
of z-statistics below estimates. ∗Stat. sig. at 95% level; ∗∗Stat. sig. at 99% level.
factors. Again, the results do not indicate that the depth to bedrock is a “smoking gun”
that solely determined the landscape of skyscrapers in Manhattan as the folklore suggests.
4.3.1 Isolating the Eﬀect of Bedrock on Skyscraper Location
We now perform two counterfactual exercises in order to isolate the eﬀect of bedrock on
skyscraper location. In the ﬁrst, we examine the predicted skyline if bedrock is held constant
across the city. In the second, we examine the predicted skyline if bedrock is the sole
determining factor for skyscraper location.
In the ﬁrst exercise, we remove the bedrock variable from the regression and then rerun
the regression to get predicted values (we use equation 3 from Table 5). We show the results
of this exercise in Figure 9. As can be seen in the ﬁgure, there is still expected to be an
absence of skyscrapers in the middle latitudes of the city (the previously described bedrock
valley) even if we remove the eﬀect of bedrock from the regression.
We display the change in probability between the estimated model and the depth to
bedrock held constant model in Figure 10, i.e., ˆ (“full” reg. w/o B.R.) − ˆ (“full” reg.).
Again, the full regression is eq. (3), from Table 5. The ﬁrst thing to notice is that the
31change in probabilities is generally very small. The largest change is 11% in absolute value.
However, if bedrock were not a factor, we would predict a small shift of skyscrapers from very
far downtown to the area around City Hall. This suggests that bedrock depths may have
inﬂuenced the placement of skyscrapers within the downtown business district; bedrock may
have shifted skyscrapers from the northern part of the ﬁnancial district to the southern part.
However, and more importantly, there is virtually no change in the probabilities where the
bedrock is the deepest; those are the districts with large foreign populations and with a high
degree of manufacturing concentration. If bedrock was a strong determinant of skyscraper
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Figure 10: Diﬀerence between predicted values with bedrock depth variation versus predicted
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Figure 11: Predicted values for a full regression (Eq. 3, Table 5) versus predicted values for
regression with just two bedrock/sea level interaction terms (Equation 2, Table 5).
For the second exercise, we contrast the predicted values of the “full”probit (Equation 3,
Table 5) to the predicted values from the probit results of Equation 2, Table 5, which only
has two variables: the depth of bedrock interacted with below and above sea level dummies.
Equation 2 should be thought of as the “bedrock only model” of skyscraper location. Figure
11 shows a scatter plot of the predicted values from these two estimations. The squares
a r et h ep r e d i c t e dv a l u e so ft h e“ f u l l ”p r o b i t( E q u a t i o n3 ,T a b l e5 )a n dt h ec i r c l e sa r et h e
predicted values from the probit results of the bedrock only estimation (Equation 2, Table
5). As shown in the ﬁgure, a bedrock only model would predict essentially no skyscrapers
below latitude 40.73 (roughly 14th Street), i.e., no skyscrapers in the bedrock valley and
no skyscrapers in the ﬁnancial district south of City Hall. That is to say, for all buildings
where bedrock is below the surface, because the estimated coeﬃcient is so small, we see
essentially no bedrock eﬀect whatsoever. On the other hand, where bedrock is above sea
level we see more accurate predicted values. To summarize, even if bedrock was the sole
determining factor for the skyline, the skyline would have developed much diﬀerently than
it did. There would have been only one skyscraper district north of 14th street; the high
skyline in the ﬁn a n c i a ld i s t r i c tw o u l dn o th a v ee x i s t e d .T h i sa l s os u g g e s t st h a tt h e r ew a sn o
“tipping point” eﬀect in the development of the midtown business district.
335C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has investigated the degree to which Manhattan’s geology has aﬀected the spatial
distribution of its skyscrapers. We focus on the ﬁrst generation of skyscrapers from 1890 to
1915, prior to the implementation of zoning regulations. The objective of this work has been
to estimate the degree to which the depth to bedrock on the island channeled skyscraper
development to areas where bedrock depths were relatively close to the surface—south of City
Hall and north of 14th Street.
We have collected two types of data sets to investigate this question. First we look at
how these depths have aﬀected construction costs for several large commercial buildings
completed between 1899 and 1915. We ﬁnd that bedrock depths only had a positive eﬀect
on costs for buildings greater than 20 stories, but the costs did not add more than 7% to the
total construction costs and were far smaller than land acquisition costs.
Next we investigate the probability of a skyscraper being built at any given location south
of 59th Street as a function of bedrock depths and several other economic variables, includ-
ing access to public transportation, land values, population density, manufacturing worker
density and the distance to a pre-established center of commerce (the ﬁnancial district). We
ﬁnd that the economic and demographic factors—agglomeration and transportation eﬀects
as well as population densities—far outweigh the eﬀect of bedrock depths on the location of
skyscrapers. In short, our results support the theory that the polycentric nature of Man-
hattans skyline is a result of a spatial equilibrium readjustment rather than from geological
considerations. That is, the evidence suggests that builders “jumped” over manufacturing
and tenement districts, in order to create a new business district that was near white col-
lar “suburban” residents, who were moving northward on Manhattan island throughout the
19th century.
One area for further investigation is the historical location of the slum and manufacturing
districts that the skyscraper developers chose to avoid. As mentioned above, these districts
are highly correlated with deep bedrock in Manhattan. Areas with bedrock nearer to the
surface tend to have better drainage and are less swampy as a result, potentially making them
less desirable residential and white collar locations. Thus, while we ﬁnd strong evidence that
34bedrock played no direct role in the location of skyscrapers in late 19th and early 20th century
New York, there may have been some indirect geological inﬂuence from earlier centuries. In
addition, further work can explore how New York City’s spatial demographics were changing
over the 19th and early-20th; this would shed light on residential patterns of diﬀerent types
of workers and skills.
35A Appendix: Data Sources and Preparation
Skyscrapers: The skyscrapers are all buildings listed as 80 meters or taller and completed between
1890 and 1915 on www.skyscraperpage.com and/or www.emporis.com (as of June 2008). These web-
sites generally provided the number of ﬂoors, and height in feet or meters. www.skyscraperpage.com
generally provides addresses. Missing addresses were found via searches on www.google.com.T h e
number of ﬂoors was also checked against Atlas of New York City, Borough of Manhattan (1921).
Information about location and whether they were a headquarters or not comes from historical
articles about each building in the New York Times.
Non-skyscrapers: First we randomly chose 100 city blocks south of 59th Street (each block has a
city tax block id #, which ranges from approximately 1 to 1500 below 59th Street.) One observation
was deleted because it was not below 59th Street. This gave us 99 randomly chosen city blocks. The
block and lot numbers were obtained from the NYC Map Portal (http://gis.nyc.gov/doitt/mp/Portal.do).
The block numbers for the non-skyscraper group were randomly generated and the lots are ran-
domly chosen once the block was identiﬁed.
Elevation, Longitude and Latitude: Google maps-based software tool from Zonum Solutions -
DigiPoint2. Elevation is relative to sea level.
D e p t ht oB e d r o c k :Bedrock depths relative to sea level were obtained from two sources (1)
“Rock Data Map Of Manhattan” provided by Dr. Klaus Jacob of the Lamont Observatory and (2)
“Bedrock And Engineering Geological Maps Of New York County,” from the US Geological Survey.
The ﬁrst map provides bedrock data for speciﬁc locations based on borings. For the skyscrapers
group it provides data for the exact building lot for the most of the observations. In case of a
missing data point on the speciﬁc block, an arithmetic average of the surrounding data points has
been used. The second map provides information in a form of contours of the bedrock surface, with
contour intervals of 20 feet. Again averages were taken as necessary. Depth to bedrock in the paper
is determined by subtracting the depth to bedrock relative to sea level from the elevation relative
to sea level.
Land Values (1909): “Tentative Land Value Maps of the City of New York” (1909). Land values
are given per linear foot of frontage. The land values in Figure 2 are calculated as follows. For
each building in the data set, average land values are calculated for the block on which the building
resides. Next the buildings are sorted from south to north. A moving average (of 5) is calculated
by averaging the land values of the two buildings south of it, the land value of the building itself,
and the two north of it.
Assembly District Manufacturing Density (1906): from Pratt (1911), Table 15.
Sanitation District Data (1890) from Vital Statistics of New York and Brooklyn Covering a
Period of Six Year Ending May 31, 1890. Census Bureau.
Number of Elevated Railroad Stops with a half mile radius (1890). Elevated railroad map of
New York, Map #4 from Landers (2000).
Construction Cost Data: Total cost, building volume and project developer name data are
from the cost job book from the Fuller Construction Company. The data is archived at the
Skyscraper Museum. Building addresses were located via historical articles in the NY Times or
from building permit information from www.metrohistory.com. Building heights were from either
www.skyscraperpage.com or the Atlas of the Borough of Manhattan (1921).
Real Brick Costs: New York City Brick Cost Index is from the Historical Statistics of the United
States. The brick costs were then divided by the value of the GDP deﬂator. Costs were normalized
so that the year 1896 had a value of 1.0.
New York City Population North of 40th Street: New York census and ward data come from
http://www.demographia.com/db-nyc-ward1800.htm
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